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CRIMINALIZING POOR PARENTING SKILLS AS A MEANS TO
CONTAIN VIOLENCE BY AND AGAINST CHILDREN
S. RANDALL HUMMt
Violence unfortunately has become commonplace in the lives of
many youth in the United States. Not only do children I commit
approximately fifteen percent of all violent crime,2 they are also
increasingly its victims.3 While juvenile crime has frequently been
analyzed apart from its adult counterpart, this distinction is rapidly
losing significance. Juvenile crime today often is inextricably linked
to illicit adult activity, especially the drug trade, and is no less
sophisticated and deadly.4 In cities such as Los Angeles and Det-
roit, special police task forces monitor juvenile gangs, which
routinely rob and murder in defense of their organized crime
operations. Violence from the streets has also infected the
classroom. Due to fear of weapon-bearing adolescents, many
schools have had to institute extraordinary measures to guarantee
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' For purposes of this Comment, "children" are persons under eighteen years of
age.2 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 174 (1987).
3 The rate of victimization for teenagers is now higher than for adults. See C.
WH1TAKER, TEENAGE VICTIMS 1 (1986) (National Crime Survey Report NCJ-103138).
Even if not directly affected by violence, young people today often suffer indirectly
from the fear and intimidation of potential violence. A survey of Boys and Girls
Clubs' members, aged 13-18, indicated that 77% lived in fear of family violence, while
68% worried about becoming the victim of violence. See Teen Trials, USA Today,
Sept. 13, 1990, at DI, col. 1.
4 See Toufexis, Our Violent Kids, TIME, June 12, 1989, at 52, 52 (describing
increases in murder, aggravated assault, and rape committed by juveniles);
Applebome, Juvenile Crime: The Offenders are Younger and the Offenses More Serious,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1987, at A16, col. 1; see also Canellos, Killings By Young Believed
on Rise; Noted Psychologist Foresees "Epidemic" Boston Globe, Aug. 13, 1990, at 17, col.
6 (predicting a fourfold increase within 10 years in the number of murders committed
by juveniles); Blau & Recktenwald, Child Homicides Soar in City and Suburbs, Chicago
Tribune, May 20, 1990, at CI, col. 2 (describing a dramatic increase in juvenile homi-
cides); Wright, Robbery by Youths on Rise in City, Newsday, Jan. 31, 1990, at 5, col. 1
(noting a 400% increase in robbery convictions between 1986 and 1989 by groups of
four or more youths).
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the security of students and teachers.5 In the home as well,
children find little peace: over two million children in the United
States are reported to be abused annually.6 Studies show that
children who face abuse in. the home are more likely to engage in
crimes against people in later years as violence begets violence.
7
Frustrated with these seemingly intractable problems, lawmakers
in many localities have begun to reevaluate the inadequacies of
previous approaches to juvenile delinquency and child abuse. While
most past efforts to curb juvenile violence have focused on
providing positive reinforcement or punishment directly to the
child, there is a growing trend toward holding parents criminally
liable for failing to supervise their children adequately when they
commit antisocial acts.8 Parents who fail to protect their children
from violence similarly are facing harsher laws and sanctions from
the courts.
9
5 See Davis, Plans Told for Security in Schools, Chicago TribuneJuly 19, 1990, at 2,
col. 1; For the Record, Washington Post, July 17, 1990, at A18, col. 5.6 See Cimons, Panel Calls Child Abuse A National Emergency, L.A. Times, June 27,
1990, at A12, col. 1; Reports of Child Abuse, Neglect Up 9% In 1989, Chicago Tribune,
Apr. 3, 1990, at 12; see also Manning & Peterson, Child Abuse's Alarming Rise, USA
Today, March 6, 1989, at 1A, col. 3 (noting that the rate of child abuse reports
increased by 212% between 1976 and 1986).7 See W. THORNTON, L. VOIGT & W. DOERNER, DELINQUENCY ANDJUSTICE 207 (2d
ed. 1987); see also Toufexis, supra note 4, at 54 (noting the relationship between
children who are abused and those who commit violent crimes). See generally Ferro,
Foreward, in EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE AND DELINQUENCY
(R. Hunner & Y. Walker eds. 1981) (noting the complex nature of relationship
between abuse and delinquency). But see Widom, Does Violence Beget Violence? A
Critical Examination of the Literature; 106 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 3, 23 (1989) (arguing
that knowledge of the long term consequences of abusive home environments is
limited).
8 See Shapiro, When Parents Pay for TheirKids'Sins, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,July
24, 1989, at 26.
9 See, e.g., State v. Deskins, 152 Ariz. 209, 210, 731 P.2d 104, 106 (1987) (holding
parents criminally liable for endangering health of their children); State v. Walden,
306 N.C. 466,468,293 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1982) (finding a mother criminally liable for
failing to prevent an assault on her child); State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 242-
43, 385 N.W.2d 145, 147 (1986) (holding a mother criminally liable for failing to
protect her two children from abu:e by husband); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(C) (1978
& Supp. 1990) (including endangerment in the definition of child abuse). The
Supreme Court of North Carolina, for example, has stated:
Although our research has revealed no controlling case in this jurisdiction
on the question of a parent's criminal liability for failure to act to save his
or her child from harm, the trend of Anglo-American law has been toward
enlarging the scope of criminal liability for failure to act in those situations
in which the common law or statutes impose a responsibility for the safety
and well-being of others.
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Parents have a duty to care for their children, which includes an
obligation to provide control and protection. According to leading
criminal law experts:
One may stand in such a personal relationship to another that he
has an affirmative duty to control the latter's conduct in the
interest of the public safety, so that omission to do so may give
rise to criminal liability. A parent not only has a duty to act
affirmatively to safeguard his children, but he also has a duty to
safeguard third persons from his children .... 10
Although parental responsibility lawsn1 are not a recent phenome-
non, 12 they gained new momentum in the 1980s. The California
legislature's passage of such a law in 198813 refocused national
media attention on the role of parents in juvenile delinquency and
Walden, 306 N.C. at 473, 293 S.E.2d at 785.
For a discussion of child abuse laws in all 50 states, see Note, Criminal Liability
for Parents Who Fail to Protec4 5 L. & INEQUALrY 359, 365-68 (1987). According to
the Note's author:
Many legislatures and courts are imposinga legal duty on parents to protect
their children. Inherent in the right to raise children is the duty to support
and protect them. Just as states will now punish professionals who fail in
their professional duty to report suspected child abuse, there appears to be
a growing willingness to punish parents who fail in their parental duty to
protect their children. As the problem of child abuse continues to grow in
this country, states are willing to take more drastic measures to stop harm
to children.
Id. at 375.
10 W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3(6) (1986).
1 As defined in this Comment, a parental responsibility law imposes an
affirmative duty on the parent to supervise and/or protect the child in a manner
consistent with societal expectations. A breach is an act of omission and is subject
to criminal sanctions.
12 These laws first gained notoriety in legal circles in the early 1970s. See Note,
A Constitutional Caveat on the Vicarious Liability of Parents, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1321 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Caveat] (questioning the effectiveness
and constitutionality of parent liability statutes); Note, Criminal Liability of Parents for
Failure to Control Their Children, 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 332 (1972) [hereinafter Note,
Criminal Liability] (recommending that parental criminal liability be limited to comply
with constitutional and criminal law); Note, "Parental Responsibility" Ordinances-Is
Criminalizing Parents When Children Commit Unlawful Acts a Solution to Juvenile
Delinquenyi 19 WAYNEL. REV. 1551 (1973) [hereinafter Note, "ParentalResponsibility"
Ordinances] (noting constitutional weaknesses and ultra vires problems with parental
responsibility ordinances); see also Shong, The Legal Responsibility of Parents for Their
Children's Delinquency, 6 FAM. L.Q. 145, 167-70 (1972) (describing a model parental
responsibility statute); Annotation, Criminal Responsibility ofParentfor Act of Child, 12
A.L.R.4TH 673, 677-78 (1982).
13 See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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on questions concerning the constitutionality of state intervention
in the family.
While some commentators have found parental responsibility
laws to be unconstitutional. or without merit,14 their analyses do
not provide a framework to differentiate among the variety of laws
that hold parents criminally liable for behavior that concerns their
offspring. Parental responsibility statutes and ordinances need
neither be unconstitutional per se, nor ineffectual. Provided that
they accord with such basic notions as due process, they can pass
constitutional muster. Unfortunately, many existing parental
responsibility laws, including the California statute, do not meet
fundamental constitutional standards or established principles of
the criminal law.
Parents should not be subject to enactments that can be used to
hold them criminally liable for their children's every transgression.
Parental responsibility laws must be drafted to proscribe only those
parental behaviors that can. foreseeably lead to the child's delin-
quency or abuse; they should recite more than a requirement of
guidance and include an objective of the parent's supervision that
helps to identify those limited circumstances and settings where the
parent can anticipate that liability will attach. In defining these
objectives, lawmakers must realistically assess the bounds of parental
authority. Assigning liability without regard to the parent's capacity
to control or protect penalizes parents for parenthood.
This Comment explores the parameters of the parent's duty to
supervise and protect the child and how legislatures and courts are
redefining that responsibility in response to the tragedy of violence
that is perpetrated by and against children. Part I describes the
emergence of parental responsibility laws, juxtaposing the current
trend of holding parents criminally liable for failure to supervise
against the tradition of state deference to family autonomy. The
prevalence of juvenile violent crime, child abuse, and the fear that
they engender are the key variables that motivate the perceived
need to hold parents more accountable for their children. Part II
analyzes several legal hurdles that must be overcome before parental
responsibility statutes and ordinances can pass constitutional
muster; irrational presumptions, vagueness, and overinclusiveness
have presented special problems for lawmakers in this context. Part
14 See Note, Constitutional Cavea4 supra note 12, at 1334; Note, Criminal Liability,
supra note 12, at 351-52; Note, "Parental Responsibility" Ordinances, supra note 12, at
1575-77.
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III adds criminal law principles to the analysis. Since parental
responsibility laws seek to punish passive conduct, they raise two
issues in the criminal law: (1) meeting the unique requirements
associated with criminal omissions, and (2) satisfying the element of
criminal causation. Finally, Part IV introduces a model of parental
control that will aid lawmakers in drafting legislation that will
overcome the pitfall of punishing parents for parenthood rather
than for unjustifiable failures in the supervision of their children.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
A. The Family's Unique Status in American Jurisprudence
The family traditionally has occupied a unique position in
American jurisprudence, as courts recognized that the family's
autonomy and freedom from state interference were crucial to its
own integrity and to the welfare of the nation.1 5 The Constitution
affords parents wide latitude in deciding how to raise their
children, 16 an interpretation that has been reiterated in a host of
Supreme Court decisions.1 7 The due process1 8 and equal protec-
tion1 9 clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and the ninth amend-
15 The Supreme Court has stated: "constitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society." Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); see also W. GRUBB & M. LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES
45-46 (1982) (discussing decline of public responsibility for children during
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and ensuing enlargement of private responsibility
for welfare of children); L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY & J. PARKER, CONTEMPORARY
FAMILY LAW §§ 1.08-1.09 (1988) (discussing courts' recognition of family autonomy
and the right of parents to raise their children without state interference).
16 The Supreme Court has indicated that a parent has a constitutional right to be
free from "undue, adverse interference by the State." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
639 n.18 (1979).
17 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (holding that parents
have a right to direct the upbringing of their children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that marriage and procreation are basic civil rights);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (stating that parents have a
liberty interest in guiding their children's intellectual and religious development);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the authority of parents to
control their children's education).
18 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977); Meyer, 262
U.S. at 399. See generally Garvey, Child Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An
Esay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 769, 771 (1978) (arguing
that the right of autonomy of both the child and the family are found in the family
itself and not its individual members).
"9 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 649 (1972).
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ment20 each provide the family unit with protection from unwar-
ranted state intrusion.
2 1
Parental responsibility statutes and ordinances significantly
depart in at least three respects from the deference that legislatures
and the courts traditionally have given to the family. First, they
intrude on parental authority over child rearing. The courts have
held consistently that the primary responsibility for child care rests
with the parents themselves, 22 and, with the exception of abuse or
severe neglect, they have been unwilling to scrutinize any particular
style of parenting. Yet, parents whose manner of supervision is
deemed lax now may be subject to criminal sanctions.2 3 Second,
parental responsibility laws represent a philosophical change in the
state's approach to the family. Implicit in the reasoning underlying
these laws is a rejection of the policy favoring the parents'judgment
concerning the child's upbringing. The belief that the state is now
more competent than the parent to define appropriate responses to
a child's behavior is at odds with the view that a parent is best
suited to carry out this task.24 Finally, the imposition of criminal
sanctions readily distinguishes these laws from most other regula-
tions that are imposed on family relationships. Only in the most
20 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
21 See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. As one commentator has noted:
Maintaining the integrity of the family is not only a reflection of interests
of the parents. It also mirrors a distinguishable, relational privacy interest,
arguably rooted in first amendment associational values, the thrust of which
is not merely to protect parental authority, but also to safeguard from state
encroachment the intimacy and autonomy of the family relationship.
Where, as in the contraceptive context, individual interests of parent and
child are likely to collide, protection of their shared relational interest
assumes independent importance and should not be directed at reinforcing
the values of parents alone, which results when a parental consent
requirement is imposed, but rather of fostering autonomous intrafamilial
resolution of controversies.
Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive
Controversy, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1001, 1017-18 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Parental Consent
Requirements] (footnotes omitted).22 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
23 According to Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional expert at the University of
Southern California Law School, parental responsibility laws are "frightening," since
they allow the state to "inquire into parenting through criminal liability." Armstrong,
Antigang Law Targets Parents, Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 1989, at 8, col. 2.
24 See id.
CRIMINALIZING POOR PARENTING SKILLS
extreme cases has the state sought to criminalize behavior that
involves interactions within the family.
25
Parental responsibility laws, however, should not be evaluated
with reference only to the integrity of the family unit. The state
also has an interest in the rights of individual family members. For
example, its authority to intervene in family affairs to protect
children from parental abuse is well established. 26  Parents,
however, are presumed in the first instance to possess the requisite
skills to raise a child successfully. The Supreme Court has stated:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization
concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over
minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course;
our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child
is "the mere creature of the State" and, on the contrary, asserted
that parents generally "have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obliga-
tions." ... Surely, this includes a "high duty" to recognize symp-
toms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice. The law's
concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their chil-
dren.
27
Parental responsibility statutes must thus be evaluated within the
confines of the tension between the state's duty to respect the
integrity of the family and its duty to protect children and the best
interests of society. In effect, parental responsibility laws represent
a legislative judgment that the state's interests transcend those of
parent or family. The motivating factor leading to this conclusion
in most circumstances is frustration with crime and violence
involving the nation's youth.
25 This restraint is a consequence of the state's deference to family autonomy. See
supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
26 Se, e.g., L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY & J. PARKER, supra note 15, § 1.09
(discussing state intervention in the family in light of tradition of deference to the
family).
27 Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (citations omitted).
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B. The Trend Toward Punishing Parents
Given the deference that lawmakers and the courts typically have
shown to parents in matters related to the family,28 the impetus
toward creating new duties for parents to follow in rearing their
children, and then imposing criminal liability for any ensuing
breach, seems remarkable. This trend raises the question of why
the state now has decided to involve itself in a domain that has for
so long been considered the exclusive province of the family.
Recent scholarly advances defining what constitutes good parenting
have not motivated this trend. Rather, these laws arise from
frustration with two related problems: (1) the state's inability to
contain juvenile lawlessness; and (2) the welfare of children who are
victims of violence and abuse.
The parental responsibility law that has gained the greatest
media attention to date was passed by the California legislature in
1988. In September of that year, California lawmakers amended
section 272 of the California Penal Code as part of the Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Protection Act (the STEP Act). The
new amendment subjects parents to criminal prosecution for failing
"to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control
over their minor child[ren]." 29 As with many similar recent legisla-
tive acts across the country,30 the California statute was passed in
28 See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
2 9 The California Penal Code now provides:
Every person who commits any act or omits the performance of any duty,
which act or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage any person
under the age of 18 years to come within the provisions of Section 300, 601,
or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or which act or omission
contributes thereto, or any person who, by any act or omission, or by
threats, commands, or persuasion, induces or endeavors to induce any
person under the age of 18 years or any ward or dependent child of the
juvenile court to fail or refuse to conform to a lawful order of the juvenile
court, or to do or to perform any act or to follow any course of conduct or
to so live as would cause or manifestly tend to cause any such person to
become or to remain a person within the provisions of Section 300,601, or
602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
For purposes of this section, aparent or legal guardian to any person under the age
of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection,
and control over their minor child.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1991).
30 See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 26; see also Parents Face Charges for Children's
Misdeeds, UPI, Feb. 5,1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file) (describing Grand Rapids,
Michigan police use of parental liability ordinance to curb escalatingjuvenile crime
rate).
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response to growing concerns with violent, juvenile crime.3 1
California legislators were disturbed by escalating gang violence
which accounted for hundreds of fatalities across the state every
year. In 1987, the year prior to the STEP Act's passage, 387 people
were killed on the streets of Los Angeles alone as a consequence of
youth gang activity.3 2 The new law also capitalized on the wide-
spread sentiment that the parents of gang members were apathetic
toward their children's illegal behavior.33
In addition to such legislative activity, the courts also have
expanded the parental duty to protect the child, especially in
circumstances involving abuse.m In State v. Williquette,35 for
example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court provided a novel interpre-
tation to the state's child abuse statute and found that parents who
fail to protect their children from abuse can be prosecuted for a
felony. Although the language of the statute seems to prohibit only
a parent's direct abuse of a minor,36 the Wisconsin court held that
a parent who knowingly permits another person to abuse his or her
child subjects the youngster to abuse under the terms of the
statute.37 Certain authorities have criticized the court's expansive
interpretation.38 Like the motives underlying California's passage
31 See Armstrong, supra note 23, at 8.
32 See Organized Criminal Activity by Youth Gangs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciaty, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1988)
(statement of'Jerry Harper, Assistant Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dep't).
-" See id. at 138 (statement of Benjamin J. Crouch, Bishop, Christ Memorial
Church of God in Christ, Pacoima, CA) (describing juvenile crime as a result of
parental neglect). This sentiment is by no means limited to California. See e.g., R.
KRAMER, AT A TENDER AGE 270 (1988) (arguing that parents should be criminally
liable when their children break the law); Gibson, Make Parents PayforActions of Kids,
USA Today, Dec. 19, 1989, at 10A (extolling the virtues of Dermott, Arkansas' new
parental liability ordinance).
34 See generally Note, supra note 9, at 359 (noting increase in laws imposing crimi-
nal liability for failure to protect children from harm).
-5 129 Wis. 2d 239, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986).
36 The Wisconsin statute provided:
Whoever tortures a child or subjects a child to cruel maltreatment,
including, but not limited, to severe bruising, lacerations, fractured bones,
burns, internal injuries or any injury constituting great bodily harm under
s. 939.22(14) is guilty of a Class E felony. In this section, "child" means a
person under 16 years of age.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.201 (West 1982).
37 See Williquete 129 Wis. 2d at 249, 385 N.W.2d at 155.
38 See, e.g., Note, Commendable or Condemnable? Criminal Liability for Parents Who
Fail to Protect Their Children from Abuse 1987 WIs. L. REv. 659 (1987) (arguing that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a result that exceeded the purpose envisioned
by the Wisconsin legislature).
1991] 1131
1132 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1123
of the STEP Act, practical concerns about child welfare were an
important consideration for the Williquette court as it looked to
broad notions of public policy to defend its decision. 39 In re-
sponse to Williquette, the Wisconsin legislature later rewrote its child
abuse law codifying those sections that held the parent criminally
liable for failing to protect the child from abuse.
40
Even though the trend toward criminalizing poor parenting skills
may be motivated by noble goals such as reducing juvenile crime
and protecting the welfare of children, the laws themselves must still
function within limits established by the Constitution. The complex
nature of the behavior that the state seeks to regulate in this
instance has made it difficult for lawmakers to define precisely what
conduct is proscribed, leaving the regulations susceptible to attack
on due process grounds. In the case of the California parental
responsibility statute, its vague language has given district attorneys
a tremendous amount of discretion to decide who is eligible for
prosecution. The Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, for
example, has developed its own procedures for determining when
a parent's behavior constitutes an offense under the act.41 A law
" The Court stated: "social policy may impose a duty to protect. The
relationship between a parent and a child exemplifies a special relationship where the
duty to protect is imposed." Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d at 245, 385 N.W.2d at 152.
40 The relevant section now reads:
(a) A person responsible for the child's welfare is guilty of a Class C felony
if that person has knowledge that another person intends to cause, is
causing or has intentionally or recklessly caused great bodily harm to the
child and is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will
prevent the bodily harm from occurring or being repeated, fails to take that
action and the failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of
great bodily harm by the other person or facilitates the great bodily harm
to the child that is caused by the other person.
(b) A person responsible for the child's welfare is guilty of a Class D felony
if that person has knowledge that another person intends to cause, is
causing or has intentionally or recklessly caused bodily harm to the child
and is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent
the bodily harm from occurring or being repeated, fails to take that action
and the failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm by the other person or facilitates the bodily harm to the child that is
caused by the other person.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(4)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1990).
41 The following guidelines describe the procedures that the Los Angeles District
Attorney created to implement § 272:
Upon referral from the Los Angeles Police Department, the District
Attorney's Truancy Mediation Program or the Probation Department, a
Deputy City Attorney will review the case to determine if sufficient evidence
exists to establish a violation of the parental accountability provisions of
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that allows for such extensive delegation of legislative authority,
including what amounts to defining the offense itself, raises serious
questions about its constitutionality.
II. REGULATING THE FoRM OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
In order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, parental responsi-
bility laws must meet at least three fundamental requirements: (1)
the law cannot be founded on a legal presumption that lacks
rationality; (2) the language of the statute or ordinance cannot be
so vague as to fail to provide fair notice and minimal standards of
enforcement; and (8) the law must be narrowly drafted to avoid
overinclusiveness. Specifically, parental responsibility laws rest on
the common legal presumption that the child's delinquent behavior
or abused condition is a consequence of poor parenting. Accord-
ingly, this first prong must be established to avoid undermining the
entire class of these laws. A deficiency in the second and third
Penal Code section 272. The City Attorney will decide at that time whether
the case should be directed to the Parenting Program for a hearing,
prepared for criminal prosecution or returned for insufficient evidence
according to the elements of the crime. While no factor will singularly
determine whether a case should be accepted, each of the following criteria
should be considered in any case presented for hearing or prosecution.
1. A detailed description of the acts or circumstances which brought
the juvenile within Sections 300, 601 or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code; (Although final adjudication of juvenile proceedings is not a
requirement for a filing against the parent, any available documentation of
the juvenile proceedings, such as arrest reports and interviews should be
included in the case file);
2. A detailed description of the acts or omissions of duty on the part
of the parent which caused or encouraged the juvenile to come within the
above provisions;
3. The number and type of warnings given to the parent and by whom;
4. Whether any parenting programs have been offered to the parents;
5. The statements and attitude of parents and the juvenile during the
investigation; (Every effort should be made to thoroughly interview parents
concerning the delinquency problem and their efforts to correct it. Miranda
warnings should be given when appropriate.);
6. The parents' present actual ability or inability to supervise and
control the offending juvenile (discuss whether there are any circumstances
beyond the control of the parent that may contribute to an inability to
effectively supervise and control);
7. The experience and training of officers involved in the investigation;
8. Neighborhood complaints or other corroboration of the problem
with the juvenile and/or the parents;
All filing decisions will be made on a case by case basis.
CITY ATTORNEY PARENTING PROGRAM PROCEDURES (CAPP) (Sept. 1989).
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requirements, however, may be remedied, since lawmakers can
modify the law to clarify its purpose and scope.
A. Legislative Presumptions
Legislatures manufacture legal presumptions primarily as a
matter of convenience to aid in both the law's construction and
application. From the lawmakers' perspective, it is much easier to
use sweeping language that incorporates presumptions than to
identify the relationships among every combination of facts
concerning the regulated activity. In the context of the criminal
law, presumptions may also reflect a legislative intent to make the
prosecution of a crime easier by simply assuming the existence of
certain facts.
The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of legislative presumptions on several occasions.
42
Since the Court's opinion in Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v.
Turnipseed Administration, a consensus has developed that
presumptive language that functions in an arbitrary or capricious
manner violates the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. The first tier of the Court's current two-part analysis
is the "rational connection test," which evaluates the relationship
between the fact that is presumed to be true and the fact that must
be proven. Although this test was first articulated in Turnipseed, the
Court refined its language in Tot v. United States:44 "[u]nder our
decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be
no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other
is arbitrary because of lack of connection .... "45
42 See e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (finding unconstitutional as
applied the presumption in 21 U.S.C. § 1769 that a possessor of marijuana is deemed
to know of its unlawful importation); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965)
(finding unconstitutional the presumption in 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(1) that the presence
of defendant at an illegal still site is evidence of the defendant's possession, custody,
or control of the still); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (finding unconsti-
tutional the presumption in § 2(t) of the Federal Firearms Act that possession
occurred through interstate transaction); Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v.
Turnipseed Admin., 219 U.S. 35 (1910) (upholding as reasonable a presumption that
derailment of railway cars is due to negligence in construction, maintenance, or
operation of the train or track).
43 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
44 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
45 Id. at 467.
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Implicit in all parental responsibility laws is the presumption
that parents can and do affect the behavior of their children.46 A
breach of the parental duty is established according to the actions
or characteristics of the child. The fact presumed is the parent's
influence, or lack thereof, and the fact to be proven is the child's
behavior or condition. While the connection between the two is not
always uniform, the presumption of the relationship is rational.47
A legislature considering the adoption of a parental responsibili-
ty law would have little difficulty finding evidence documenting the
linkage between parenting practices and delinquency.48 Numerous
sociological studies attest to the significant influence that parents
wield in averting their children from antisocial behavior. 49 Re-
searchers have not only examined the interaction of parent and
child in the context of delinquency, they have also isolated charac-
teristics of that relationship that appear to be correlated with
juvenile violence. One of the most important variables is the quality
of parental supervision and monitoring of the child's behavior.
50
Supervision or monitoring refers to the parents' "awareness of their
child's peer associates, free time activities, and physical whereabouts
when outside the home."51 Lax supervision is correlated with
46 See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 501 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. Sup. 1985) (noting that the
Delaware "statutes and the case law imposing liability presume the obvious, that in
our culture, the parent of a child, with whom that child resides, has authority and
control over the child"), aff', 515 A.2d 397 (Del. Sup. 1986).47 See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
48 Statutory presumptions seldom are implicated in situations involving child
abuse, since what is prohibited typically is a direct consequence of the parent's act or
omission.
41 See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. But see S. SAMENOw, BEFORE IT'S
TOO LATE: WHY SOME KIDS GET IN TROUBLE AND WHAT PARENTS CAN Do ABOUT
IT (1989) (arguing that irrespective of the parent's influence, it is the child who
ultimately chooses to be delinquent).
50 See Wilson, Parental Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of Delinquency, 20 BRrr. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 203, 204 (1980).
51 Snyder & Patterson, Family Interaction and Delinquent Behavior, in HANDBOOK
OFJuvENILE DELINQUENCY 225-26 (H. Quay ed. 1987).
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delinquency 52 irrespective of social handicap and place of resi-
dence.53 According to one pair of researchers:
In the lax style, parents are not sufficiently attuned to what
constitutes problematic or antisocial behavior in their children.
Consequently, they allow much of it to slip by, without disciplinary
action. For a variety of reasons, they fail to recognize or accept
the fact that their children are involved in deviant, antisocial, or
even violent actions. They simply do not believe it is happening,
or they convince themselves that there is very little they can do
about it.
5 4
The same inattentive practices that have been correlated with
general delinquency also appear to be significant in explaining
violent and aggressive behavior in juveniles.
55
The conclusion that parents exert a substantial degree of
influence over the behavioral development of their children is not
surprising. The Supreme Court's analysis of presumptions does not
end, however, with a mere finding that the fact presumed may be
related to the fact proven. The second part of the Court's analysis
includes an element of probability. In Leary v. United States,5 6 the
Court stated: "a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded
as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it
can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is
made to depend." 57  Thus, a parental responsibility law that
defines a parent's culpability based on the delinquent status of the
52 See L. GEISMAR & K. WOOD, FAMILY AND DELINQUENCY: RESOCIALIZING THE
YOUNG OFFENDER 25 (1986); W. THORNTON, L. VOIGT & W. DOERNER, supra note 7,
at 205-06; Patterson, Some Speculations and Data Relating to Children Who Stea; in
THEORY AND FACT IN CONTEMPORARY CRIMINOLOGY 204 (T. Hirschi & M. Gott-
fredson eds. 1980); Patterson & Dishion, Contributions of Families and Peers to Delin-
quency, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 63, 76 (1985); Stanfield, The Interaction of Family Variables
and Gang Variables in the Aetiology of Delinquency, 13 SoC. PROBS. 411 (1966); see also
R. Kramer, supra note 33, at 216; Hanson, Henggeler, Haefile & Rodick, Demographi4
Individual and Family Relationship Correlates of Serious and Repeated Crime Among
Delinquents and Their Siblings, 52J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PsYCHOLOGY 528 (1984)
(noting a relationship between delinquency and parents' general lack of control over
the child); Wells & Rankin, Direct Parental Controls and Delinquency, 26 CRIMINOLOGY
263 (1988) (arguing that "direct controls" over children can affect delinquency).
53 See Wilson, supra note 50, at 231.
54 C. BARTOL & A. BARTOL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 211 (1989).
55 See P. STRASBURG, VIOLENT DELINQUENTS 58 (1978); see also Sorrells, Kids Who
Kil 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 312, 318 (1977) (noting the relationship between juvenile
violence and parents' failure as proper role models).
5 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
57 Id. at 36.
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child could only stand if there was "substantial assurance" that the
phenomenon of juvenile delinquency "more likely than not" results
from the acts or omissions of the parent. This presumption greatly
exceeds the available evidence on juvenile delinquency.
The role of presumptions in parental responsibility laws was
addressed by a NewJersey appeals court in Doe v. City of Trenton.
58
In that case, the parent of a thirteen year old boy, who had been
convicted for the second time in one year of violating the public
peace, 59 was charged with breach of the City of Trenton's parental
responsibility ordinance.6" The court found that the ordinance
violated due process based on the lack of rationality in the presump-
tion that the child's misconduct "more likely than not" resulted
from any active or passive wrongdoing on the part of the par-
ents.61 The court wrote:
The City of Trenton provides us with nothing which would
support a finding that parental influence is an overriding cause of
juvenile misconduct. Certainly, there has been demonstrated no
basis for a court to take judicial notice of such a proposition. Nor
can it be said to be self-evident. Indeed, there is nothing to
suggest that there is any calculus of probabilities which would
compel such a conclusion.
6 2
The New Jersey court's analysis seems correct. The multiplicity of
factors that may lead a child to commit a delinquent act are not
58 143 N.J. Super. 128, 362 A.2d 1200 (1976), aff'T 75 N.J. 137, 380 A.2d 703
(1977).
59 "Violations of the public peace" included any adjudication of delinquency or
being ajuvenile in need of supervision (JINS). See id. at 1202.
'The ordinance read in part:
It shall be unlawful for any parent to assist, aid, abet, allow, permit, suffer
or encourage a minor to commit a violation of the public peace, as defined
herein, either by overt act, by failure to act or by lack of supervision and
control over such minor.... If at any time within one year of the giving of
such notice, such minor shall be charged with a violation of the public
peace, and shall again be adjudicated delinquent, it shall be presumed,
subject to rebuttal by competent evidence that the parents of said minor
during said period of time, allowed, permitted or suffered said minor to
commit a violation of the public peace.
Doe 143 N.J. Super. at 130 n.1, 362 A.2d at 1201-02 n.1.
61 Id. at 131, 362 A.2d 1203.
62 Id.
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dominated by any single influence. 63 The weakness in the Trenton
ordinance is its attempt to link all juvenile delinquency to one
antecedent-the parent's behavior. The court's holding in this sense
is a limited one;6 4 it does not deny an overriding parental role in
more strictly defined juvenile activities. An ordinance that
addressed a narrower range of child behavior, and that closely
linked the parent's role as supervisor to that behavior would not
encounter the objections that the New Jersey court posed in Doe.
6 5
B. The Requirements of Fair Warning and Minimal
Standards of Enforcement
Legislative acts also must pass a vagueness threshold to pass
constitutional muster. The "void-for-vagueness" doctrine 66 of the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
mandates that any criminal law which is so vague that "men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application" 67 must be struck down as void.
Vague laws suffer from two fundamental defects. First, they fail
to provide fair warning as to what acts are specifically forbidden.
68
65 See, e.g., W. THORNTON, L. VoIGT & W. DOERNER, supra note 7, at 81-263
(discussing biological, psychological, sociological, and situational theories of
delinquency); Wells & Rankin, supra note 52, at 263-64 (noting multiplicity of
variables affecting delinquency).
64 The limited nature of the court's holding is evident in the way it phrased the
issue: "The precise question before this court is whether we may state with 'substan-
tial assurance' that a minor's second public peace adjudication was 'more likely than
not' the result of passive or active wrongdoing on the part of the minor's parent or
parents." Doe; 143 N.J. Super. at :132, 362 A.2d at 1203.
65 In addition to examining the validity of the presumption, lawmakers should also
consider the likelihood that the presumption will disproportionately affect certain
identifiable groups such as people of low-income, single parents, and racial and ethnic
minorities. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the risk of equal protection
violations should not be discounted.
66 Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach
where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is
proscribed. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). See generally
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Cour4 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960)
(describing the application of the doctrine in various Supreme Court decisions).
67 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
68 As Justice Holmes explained:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the
law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should
be given to the world in language that the common world will understand,
of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
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The Supreme Court has held that: "[n]o one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids."69 The second and most serious defect
according to the Supreme Court70 is that statutory vagueness
violates due process by allowing for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. 71 "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc
and subjective basis . ... "72
For purposes of vagueness analysis, parental responsibility laws
can be classified into two general categories-omnibus and result-
defined. Both classifications consist of language describing three
elements: (1) the parent or guardian, (2) the child, and (3) the
prescribed guidance. For example, section 272 of the California
Penal Code states that "a parent or legal guardian to any person
under the age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable
care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor
child."73 The first two elements are stated explicitly in the statute
and the "duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection,
and control" constitutes the final element.
Result-defined laws, however, include one additional element;
they add an objective for the parent's guidance. For example, many
states and municipalities have enacted laws requiring parents to
ensure that their children attend school. 74 The Maryland compul-
sory public school attendance statute provides that "[e]ach person
who has under his control a child who is 6 years old or older and
under 16 shall see that the child attends school or receives instruc-
69 Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
70 The Court has stated:
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary
enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect
of the vagueness doctrine is "not actual notice, but the other principal
element of the doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement."
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357-58 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 574 (1974)).
71 See Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
72 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
73 CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1990).
7" Although school attendance laws, as well as curfew restrictions, do not
specifically address violent activities, they show by analogy how parental responsibility
laws can be narrowly drafted to avoid due process challenges. See infra notes 80-85
and accompanying text.
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tion as required by this section."75 The penalty for breach of this
duty is a fine, not to exceed fifty dollars per absence or imprison-
ment for not more than ten days, or both.76 This law includes the
first three elements (parent, child, and guidance), and adds the
objective of the guidance: 'that the child attends school or receives
instruction as required by this section."
7 7
As a matter of sound policy, the objective of the guidance itself
should also meet two criteria in order to prevent void-for-vagueness
challenges. First, it must be sufficiently definite. A law that
imposed a duty on parents to protect their children from evil would
not withstand constitutional scrutiny. What constitutes "evil" is
subject to many conflicting interpretations, leaving the parent
without adequate notice of the parameters of the duty in question.
Second, the objective can not depend on an irrational presump-
tion.78 A law that holds parents criminally liable for failure to
supervise their children, and then finds a lack of supervision in any
situation involving the child's delinquency probably presumes too
much.79 The law must be narrowly drafted so that the parent's
influence on the juvenile's activity is not overwhelmed by other
intervening variables.
In the case of In Rejeannette L.,8 0 a Maryland court of appeals
upheld the constitutionality of Maryland's compulsory school
attendance statute against a void-for-vagueness challenge.8 1 The
law under attack was result-defined, since it held the parent
responsible for the child's attendance at school, and not his or her
status as a delinquent. The court found that the language was
sufficiently definite to nodfy parents of their prescribed duties.
Their familiarity with the need to attend school, and frequent
involvement in its affairs, strengthens the presumption that a child's
failure to attend is a consequence of the parent's lack of attention.
Curfew ordinances are another example of parental responsibili-
ty laws that are result-defined, and hence can meet constitutional
standards of notice and enforcement if narrowly drafted. In
75 MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-501(c) (1989).
76 See id. § 7-301(e)(2).
77 Id. § 7-301(c).
78 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
79 See Doe, 143 N.J. Super. at 133, 362 A.2d at 1203.
" 71 Md. Ct. App. 70, 523 A.2d 1048 (1987).
81 See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also Commonwealth v. Ross, 17
Pa. Commw. 105,330 A.2d 290 (1975) (upholding the enforceability of Pennsylvania
compulsory school attendance statute).
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Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,82 a federal district court upheld
a curfew ordinance against a void-for-vagueness challenge. The
ordinance provided that "it is unlawful for a parent having legal
custody of a minor knowingly to permit or by inefficient control to
allow such minor to be on or remain upon the street in violation of
the curfew."83 The ordinance also included many exceptions that
permitted minors to be on the streets during the curfew hours. The
court struck down language in three of the exceptions, but upheld
those provisions which had a direct, logical nexus with the interests
of both the parent and child,84 including such circumstances as
when the parent accompanied the child, the child was returning
from a school event, or the parent had notified the police of the
child's need to be on the street during the curfew hours.8 5 The
exceptions revealed a legislative intent to make the objective of the
parent's guidance not simply to remove children from the streets
during certain hours, but to ensure that parents were in control of
their children after the curfew hour.
Unlike result-defined parental responsibility laws, omnibus laws
are much more vulnerable to attack under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. Omnibus statutes and ordinances merely define a
82 401 F. Supp 1242, aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964
(1976).
83 Id. at 1247.
s The court reasoned:
The ordinance prohibits minors of specific age groups from being on the
streets of the Borough during clearly specified hours unless they are
accompanied by a parent or otherwise qualify under one of the numerous
exceptions. The exceptions are necessarily couched in language which
classify the types of activities and the kinds of circumstances which are
outside the proscription of the ordinance, it being impossible to compile an
all-inclusive list of every factual situation which would warrant a minor being
present on the streets during the curfew hours. The ordinance dearly gives
fair warning as to what it proscribed and through mayoral advisory opinions
(see Section 9) provides a means for the citizenry to determine officially in
any given factual situation what is prohibited. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 1965,
379 U.S. 559, 568-569, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 ("near" the courthouse
not impermissibly vague, particularly in light of on-the-spot administrative
interpretation by officials charged with enforcing statute upon which
demonstrators could rely). The ordinance contains no broad invitation to
subjective or discriminatory enforcement and does not deposit unbridled or
unlimited discretion in the hands of law enforcement officials.
Id. at 1252-53.
" See id. at 1246-47. The many exceptions to the curfew probably saved the
ordinance from a challenge of overbreadth. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying
text.
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relationship between the parent and child, and do not restrict the
parent's liability to well-defined circumstances. Stating that a parent
must exercise reasonable control or supervision over a child does
not provide notice of what behavior the state seeks to prohibit. Of
even greater concern than the lack of notice is the tremendous
discretion that such regulations give to law enforcement officials.
Section 272 of the California Penal Code 86 again provides an
excellent example. As a consequence of the vagueness in this
statute, the District Attorney's Office for Los Angeles County
established its own guidelines to determine when the statute had
been violated. 7 The possibility of arbitrary enforcement of this
law is great, since the definition of the crime itself can vary from
case to case.
C. The Problem of Overinclusiveness
In addition to vagueness, omnibus parental responsibility laws
are vulnerable to attack on grounds of overinclusiveness. 8 8 Any
enactment that "reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct" is void.8 9 The sweeping language of the
omnibus laws likely infringes on aspects of the parent-child
relationship that have found protection in the Constitution. As
previously noted, parents have a liberty interest in deciding how to
raise their children.9 0 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,91 as well as other
Supreme Court cases, 92 provide strong support for parental
" See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 41.
88 The Supreme Court has commented on the close connection between
overinclusiveness and vagueness, and the problem the former creates in the context
of the criminal law:
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of government.
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876).
89 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). "A law
is void on its face for overbreadth if it 'does not aim specifically at evils within the
allowable area of [government] contxol but.., sweeps within its ambit other activities
that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise' of protected expressive or ass-
ociational rights." Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1038
n.13 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)), rev'd on
other grounds, 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
" See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
91 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
92 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right of the Amish
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privacy and the family's freedom from state interference. The right
of intimate family association is also protected under the first
amendment. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,93 the Supreme
Court elaborated on the Bill of Rights' significance to the family:
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is
designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation
and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships
a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by
the State.... The personal affiliations... entitled to this sort of
constitutional protection are... the creation and sustenance of a
family... the raising and education of children .... 94
A law that allows the state to review virtually every aspect of the
parent's supervision over the child is inconsistent with the impor-
tance that the Supreme Court has assigned to the right of intimate
family association and its deference to parents in matters involving
child rearing. One critic of the California parental responsibility
statute has written:
Almost every parent must deal with a wide range of misbehavior
by their children. The approaches taken to discipline and
guidance in this area are infinite in variation. Usually parents are
in the best position to know what is best for their children in a
world in which the effects of parental discipline and guidance is
limited by sometimes overwhelming forces in the community at
large. The challenged provision authorizes law enforcement
authorities to second guess every parental decision with the threat
of criminal penalties if a parent has made the wrong choices as it
appears to an unforgiving police officer or prosecutor after the
fact based on the hidden standardless judgments of those law
enforcement authorities.
95
Parental responsibility laws that specify an objective of the
parent's guidance also can be struck down for overbreadth if they
are not narrowly tailored. In Johnson v. City of Opelousas,96 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a curfew ordinance for
infringing upon constitutionally protected activity. In that case, the
City of Opelousas passed an ordinance that prohibited anyone
not to send their children to high school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(allowing children to be taught in a language other than English).
93 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
94Id. at 618-19.
95 Brief for Plaintiff at 22-23, Williams v. Reiner, No. C 731 376 (Super. Ct. of
Cal., County of Los Angeles 1990).
96 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
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under 17 years of age from being on the city streets during certain
hours except when accompanied by a parent or other responsible
adult or on an emergency errand.9 7 The court found that the
ordinance violated the constitutionally protected rights of minors
and their parents, noting that, unlike the ordinance in Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown,98 the Opelousas ordinance made no provi-
sion for protected associational activities such as attendance at
school meetings or religious functions. The court also felt that the
ordinance would prohibit parents from encouraging their children's
participation in these protected activities.
99
III. PREREQUISITES OF PUNISHMENT
In addition to satisfying any requirements that the Constitution
imposes, parental responsibility laws should also adhere to criminal
law principles. The criteria that the state creates to isolate culpable
behavior largely determine the distribution of the resulting
punishment. Conduct, in order to be criminal, typically implicates
five elements: (1) actus reus (an act or omission), (2) mens rea,
(3) concurrence of the act or omission and mens rea, (4) causation,
and (5) harm. 100 Before the state can punish, it must demon-
strate either that these elements are present or that an exception
that renders one or more of them unnecessary applies. For
example, in some circumstances, the state may wish to hold its
citizens strictly liable for the consequences of their conduct,
eliminating the mens rea and concurrence requirements. In
contrast, an act or omission is always required since the imposition
of criminal sanctions cannot proceed from the mere possession of
undesirable thoughts.
Parental responsibility laws raise difficult issues concerning the
act, mens rea, and causation elements of crime. In those few
instances where the criminal law is applicable to family relation-
ships, it typically penalizes affirmative conduct. A parent intention-
ally injures a child and is punished for abuse. Parental responsibili-
ty laws, in contrast, punish passive conduct-the parent is penalized
for failing to supervise or protect the child.
97 See id. at 1067 n.1.
98 401 F. Supp 1242 (1975), af'rd 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 964 (1976).
" See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072.
100 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 10, § 3.1, at 269-71.
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A. Criminal Omissions
1 °1
Criminal liability for an omission can arise in one of two ways.
First, the state can define the omission itself as an offense. For
example, in most states it is a crime for a motorist to ignore a police
officer's command to stop; the failure to stop constitutes the
offense.10 2 Second, a duty to act can be created with liability
resulting from nonperformance.Y0 Parental responsibility laws
are part of this latter category. The state imposes an affirmative
duty on the parent to provide guidance, which if ignored leads to
criminal sanctions. The source of this duty is based on the
relationship of the parent to the child.
10 4
There are at least two reasons why the imposition of criminal
liability for nonperformance of a duty is controversial. First, a
governmental order to act is considered far more intrusive than a
demand to refrain from engaging in proscribed conduct.
10 5
When the duty concerns family relationships, the degree of
intrusiveness is even greater. Second, nonperformance is difficult
to define since the law only describes the duty and not the accept-
able means by which it is to be discharged.10 6 There is far more
uncertainty created when the criminal law attempts to punish what
remains after delimiting the permissible, rather than prohibiting
specific affirmative behaviors.
Omnibus parental responsibility laws create a wide entree for
state meddling in family affairs. Since the element of guidance is
defined so broadly, virtually any child's misbehavior can be traced
to an omission on the part of the parent. This results in the de
facto imposition of vicarious liability; the parents are punished for
the misbehaviors of the child and not their own acts or omissions.
101 See generally Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REV.
367 (1965); Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958); Kirchheimer,
Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. REv. 615 (1942); Robinson, Criminal Liability for
Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of the Law in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 101 (1984).
102 See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3733 (Purdon 1977) (fleeing or attempting
to elude police officer).
105 The Model Penal Code has recognized both of these routes: "Liability for the
commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action
unless: (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense;
or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.01(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
104 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
105 See Robinson, supra note 101, at 104.
106 See id.
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While the danger of such abuse is diminished in result-defined laws,
since at least an objective of the parent's guidance is created, it is
still sufficiently present to warrant concern. Even within this latter
category, the law rarely reflects rational expectations about the
guidance a parent can wield over a child or young adult.
At least one court has already ruled that the imposition of
vicarious liability on parents for the acts of their children violates
due process. In State v. Akers, I0 7 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court ruled that a state statute10 8 that held parents responsible
for violations their children committed while operating "off highway
recreational vehicles" contradicted the state's constitution and
criminal code. The court found that a prerequisite to criminal
liability is an act or omission, noting the command of the New
Hampshire Criminal Code that "[a] person is not guilty of an
offense unless his criminal liability is based on conduct that includes
a voluntary act or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which
he is physically capable." 10 9  Given that the statute failed to
specify any act or omission on the part of the parents before
imposing criminal liability, the court held that the statute violated
due process by criminalizing the status of parenthood. "[W]e are
convinced that the status of parenthood cannot be made a crime.
This, however is the effect of [the statute].... There is no other
basis for criminal responsibility other than the fact that a person is
the parent of one who violates the law."
1 10
The principles that the New Hampshire Supreme Court
articulated in Akers echo those established in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Robinson v. California.i n There, the Court
struck down a California law that made it a criminal offense for a
person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." 112 It noted that
the law called for punishment based on the mere status of addic-
tion, and did not require any overt act or omission. The Court held
that:
107 119 N.H. 161,400 A.2d 38 (1979).
108 The statute stated in part that "[tihe parents or guardians or persons assuming
responsibility will be responsible for any damage incurred or for any violations of this
chapter by any person under the age of 18." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 269-C:24 IV
(1977).
109 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 626:11 (1987).
110 Akers, 119 N.H. at 163, 400 A.2d at 40.
"1 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
112 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1975).
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This statute... is not one which punishes a person for the use of
narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial
or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration. It is
not a law which even purports to provide or require medical
treatment. Rather, we deal with a statute which makes the "status"
of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender
may be prosecuted "at any time before he reforms." California has
said that a person can be continuously guilty of this offense,
whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics within
the State, and whether or not he has been guilty of any antisocial
behavior there.
113
In the same way, any law that punishes parents without respect
to actus reus, holding them culpable based solely on their status as
parents, will be unconstitutional. As one court noted: "[s]ome act
of commission or omission lies at the foundation of every
crime." 114 Lawmakers drafting parental responsibility laws should
avoid the pitfall of vicarious liability by (1) framing the law with
respect to the parent's behavior, and (2) requiring that the parent
have an independent interest either in the child's activity or in the
forum 115 where it occurs. 116  The latter requirement would re-
inforce the notion that the parent is not being punished for the acts
of the child, as well as help to avoid defenses based on ignorance of
the law. The specification of the parental interest would necessarily
correspond with rational expectations of parental control.
To the extent that parental responsibility laws create extraordi-
nary duties beyond rational expectations of parental control, they
may even reach the realm of impossibility. The state cannot impose
a duty to do the impossible, such as requiring that parents actively
supervise their children at all times. 117 The parent must have the
11 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
114 State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 148, 80 A.2d 617, 622 (1951), ove-uled, State v.
Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 342 A.2d 841 (1975).
115 Two examples where the parent has such an independent interest in the forum
are the home and school. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
116 See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
117 In United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the Supreme Court discussed the
defense of impossibility to charges brought under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938:
The theory upon which responsible corporate agents are held criminally
accountable for "causing" violations of the Act permits a claim that a defen-
dant was "powerless" to prevent or correct the violation to "be raised defen-
sively at a trial on the merits." If such a claim is made, the defendant has
the burden of coming forward with evidence, but this does not alter the
Government's ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the
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capacity to exercise the necessary level of guidance before being
held criminally liable for failing to meet that standard. In jurisdic-
tions where parental responsibility laws are in force, not every
prosecutor is willing to recognize the parent's inability to control
the child as a defense to prosecution. For example, the guidelines
that the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office has established to
implement California's parental responsibility statute provide that
"[i]f the parents ... are unable or unwilling to control their minor
children, they will be subject to vigorous prosecution by our
office."
118
The assignment of mens rea in parental responsibility laws is
also problematic. Their intrusiveness into the family is at a peak
when mens rea is not an element of the offense; the imposition of
strict liabilityl 10 eliminates the defense of mistake of fact and the
parent is presumed to know the facts which give rise to the duty to
act. Although certain commentators have criticized the statutory
imposition of strict liability for crimes, 120 with at least one com-
mentator claiming that knowledge is a prerequisite to culpability for
an omission, 121 there is no question that the Constitution permits
the elimination of mens rea as an element of a criminal
offense. 122 In the landmark case of United States v. Balint,
123
defendant's guilt, including his power, in light of the duty imposed by the
Act, to prevent or correct the prohibited condition.
Id. at 673 (citations omitted).
118 CrrY ATTORNEY PARENTING PROGRAM PROCEDURES, supra note 41, at 4
(emphasis added).
19 It is important not to confuse strict liability with vicarious liability. The former
eliminates the requirements of mens rea and concurrence, and allows the individual
to be punished for the result alone. Vicarious liability, in contrast, imputes the act
or omission of one person to another. A parent, for example, could be held liable
for the behavior of the child under this doctrine.
12 0 See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,422-
25 (1958); Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An
Argumentfor a ConstitutionalDoctine ofMens Rea, 10 HoUs. L. REV. 1039, 1057 (1973);
Johnson, Strict Liability: The Prevalent View, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1518, 1520-21 (S. Kadish ed. 1983) (noting that strict liability is fundamentally unfair
since it can lead to punishing persons who have taken all reasonable steps to comply
with the law); Note, Criminal Liability, supra note 12, at 345-47.
121 See Note, "Parental Responsibility" Ordinances, supra note 12, at 1570 (arguing
for "the giving of notice to the parent of his child's specific bad conduct before a duty
will be imposed upon that parent to guard against future similar actions").
12 2 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 10, at 346; Note, Criminal Liability
Without Fault: A Philosophical Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1517, 1528 (1975)
(listing the areas in which court,; have upheld statutes that impose liability on
individuals without mens rea).
123 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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the Supreme Court ruled that knowledge was not a necessary
element of an offense created under a federal narcotics statute,
sustaining an indictment that carried a maximum penalty of five
years in prison.1 24 The Court has since upheld the holding in
Balint on numerous occasions. 125 "We do not go with Blackstone
in saying that 'a vicious will' is necessary to constitute a crime ...
for conduct alone without regard to the intent of the doer is often
sufficient." 126 Provided that the parental duty is consistent with
what is normally contemplated to be in the parent's supervisory and
protective domain, 127 lawmakers remain free to assign the level
of culpability that they deem appropriate, including strict liability.
This is consistent with the Court's long-standing belief that the
assignment of mens rea is a task for the legislature. 128 "There is
wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude
elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition."
129
The policy rationales of the criminal law justify the delegation
of this discretion to elected representatives. The legislature may
believe, for example, that the strict liability standard serves a useful
deterrent function, and will force people to be more diligent in
seeking out relevant facts. 30 Parents, for example, who are
124 See id. at 251-54.
125 See e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975) (holding food
retailer strictly liable under provisions of Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act);
Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260-63 (1952) (approving the Court's
holding in Baling but refusing to construe the mere omission of intent from a statute
as eliminating that element from the crime); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277,281-83 (1943) (finding a corporate officer strictlyliable for shipping misbranded
and adulterated drugs).
126 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (citation omitted).
127 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
128 The origins of this rule began with ChiefJustice Taft's finding in Balint that
mens rea"is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court." Baling 258
U.S. at 252.129 Lamberg; 355 U.S. at 228.
150 See Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731
(1960). According to Wasserstrom, "it seems reasonable to believe that the presence
of strict liability offenses might have the added effect of keeping a relatively large
class of persons from engaging in certain kinds of activity." Id. at 737. His argument
is bolstered by other statements such as the following-
An individual who knows that certain future conduct, if engaged in inadver-
tently, will be punished is given a motive for taking steps now to insure that
he will not be inadvertent in the future. For example, he may establish an
enforced daily regimen of attention to certain details of his conduct,
previously ignored. In time, such attention may become habitual, thereby
decreasing the likelihood of inadvertently violating rules pertaining to that
area of conduct and consequently minimizing intrinsically disvaluable
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subject to an ordinance that holds them responsible for failing to
prevent their child's sale of drugs out of their home would probably
be more inclined to inspect the home for narcotics and to monitor
the child's visitors. 13 1 Although imposing strict liability on par-
ents would probably be imprudent at this time given the current
state of parental responsibility laws, this impediment could be
removed if legislatures begin to draft the enactments according to
rational standards of parental control. Until this occurs, parents in
many jurisdictions will be subject to vague laws that fail to comport
with the reality of contemporary parent-child relations.
B. Causation
The lack of specificity in most parental responsibility laws
concerning which acts satisfy the parent's duty also leads to
questions about the element of causation.13 2  In most jurisdic-
tions, in order to impose criminal liability, the defendant's conduct
must be both (1) the actual or "but for" cause, and (2) the "proxi-
mate" cause of the result.13 The former requirement necessitates
a finding that the result would not have occurred in the absence of
the defendant's conduct. The Model Penal Code states that
"[c]onduct is the cause of a result when.., it is an antecedent but
for which the result in question would not have occurred."
13 4
This formulation, however, does not require that the conduct be the
exclusive cause of the result. If two causes intervene to bring about
a result, and each is itself sufficient, then both are said to be the
"actual" causes. In the omission context, actual cause is not useful
in assigning liability since it fails to limit those eligible for punish-
ment. In theory, if a child dies in a fire, everyone in a position to
rescue the child could be held accountable since "but for" their
consequences. The agent's motivation for acting in such a way is his desire
to avoid the punishment which he knows will be inflicted if he inadvertently
breaks the law.
Note, supra note 122, at 1538 n.88.
131 Any lawmaker considering strict liability should realize, however, that the
"great majority of academic writing has opposed absolute liability." S. KADISH & S.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCEsSES 316 (1989); see also supra note 120.
132 See generally Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CALIF. L.
REV. 547 (1988) (criticizing the concept of "legal duty" as a basis to limit the
imposition of liability for omissions).
133 See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOWt, supra note 10, § 3.12, at 392.
134 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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omission to rescue, the child would not have perished.3 5 For this
reason the criminal law largely relies on the second prong of the
causation analysis, or "proximate cause," to further restrict the
assignment of liability for omissions.
A defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of an outcome
if it foreseeably leads to the result or risk created. Again, under the
Model Penal Code, only when "the actual result ... is not too
remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a Uust] bearing on
the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense" is criminal
liability imposed.13 6  The justification for the proximate cause
requirement is fundamental fairness, since there are many circum-
stances where actual cause exists but the final result is far too
removed from the conduct for criminal liability to attach.
13 7
Unless parental responsibility laws are carefully drafted to reflect
the parent's reasonable ability to guide the child as the forum and
nature of the child's activity changes, these laws will likely violate
the principles of causation. In order to establish actual causation,
the state must first establish that the child's misconduct would not
have occurred "but for" the parent's neglect. If the law's character-
ization of the requisite parental guidance is too broad, it may dilute
the force of the parent's actions. When this is coupled with a
prohibition against a large class of conduct, the parent's guidance
may become insignificant, eliminating the parent as the actual cause
of the harmful behavior.
Vague laws also fare poorly under proximate cause analysis. As
previously noted, the hallmark of proximate cause is foreseeability.
Omnibus laws rarely clarify causal linkages since any child misbehav-
ior can be attributed ex post facto to parental inattention. Merely
recognizing the existence of a parent-child relationship does not
prove causation, since proximate cause requires that the parent's
actions predictably lead to the child's misbehavior or abused state.
Result-defined laws, in contrast, better elucidate causal linkages by
evaluating the parental conduct with regard to a specified activity or
forum. This advantage, however, is contingent on the degree of
definiteness found in the objective of the parent's guidance. If no
135 See Robinson, supra note 101, at 110.
136 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.03(2)(b), (3)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
137 For example, if X tries to shoot Y and misses, and Y flees in his auto and is
killed in an accident, X's conduct is the actual cause of Y's death. "But for" X's
attempted murder, Ywould not have been involved in the auto accident. X cannot
be held for murder, however, since the ensuing accident was not a foreseeable conse-
quence of X's conduct.
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definite objective exists, the specificity necessary to establish
proximate cause will still be lacking.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF PARENTAL CONTROL
Parents cannot realistically be expected to exercise control over
their children under all circumstances. Unfortunately, many
parental responsibility laws ignore this simple and obvious premise
by failing to limit the parent's culpability to situations in which the
child's misbehavior or abused condition can foreseeably be
attributed to an act or omission on the part of the parent. The
recognition of a hierarchy of parental control would aid in the
construction of parental responsibility laws in at least four ways.
First, a hierarchy of parental control would create a foundation
upon which definite and explicit legislation could be crafted. Since
the nature of the supervisory relationship between parent and child
would cease to be a matter of conjecture, lawmakers could more
easily tailor legislation to provide the degree of specificity necessary
for notice and minimal standards of enforcement.1 3 8 Narrowly
focused legislation would also eliminate challenges based on
overinclusiveness. 139  Second, such a model would encourage
lawmakers to draft laws that are consistent with realistic expecta-
tions of parental capacities. Parents would not be held criminally
liable for failing to exercise supervision in situations that are too far
removed from their direct oversight. The parent would only be
punished for legitimate acts or omissions and not for the status of
parenthood. 140 Third, since the model's organization would be
rational, there would be no basis to question the underlying
legislative presumptions. 14 1  Any irrational presumptions that
would violate due process would be eliminated in the organization
of the model itself. Finally, a hierarchy of control would provide
substantiation for the element of criminal causation. 142 The
linkages between the parent and child would be both explicit and
foreseeable.
Since parent-child relationships are highly variable, any model
of parental control should account for the parent's changing
supervisory role in at least the following three dimensions: (1)
138 See supra notes 66-87 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 101-31 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
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spatial, (2) social, and (3) chronological. While none of these
considerations alone are dispositive of the level of parental control,
each strongly affects the parent's ability to exercise authority over
the child.
In the most rudimentary sense, the parent's ability to supervise
is contingent on physical proximity to the child. When the parent
is in the child's presence, he or she is able to observe the child's
behavior and provide immediate reinforcement or punishment.
Since the parent typically is the most important authority figure to
the youngster,143 parental control normally will be at a maximum
in such circumstances. As the child's spatial proximity to the parent
decreases, thus diminishing oversight opportunities, expectations
concerning the parent's control also wane.
The level of parental control will also vary according to the
social forum where the child's behavior occurs. Activities which
take place in the home, for example, are normally recognized as
falling within the supervisory purview of the parents, even though
they may not be physically present at the time. The parental duty
includes responsibility for the maintenance and care of the home
and family on a continuous basis. In contrast, the level of parental
authority exercised over the child's relationships in other settings
may be drastically different. A parent does not have the same
ability to monitor and regulate the child's behavior in school or
among friends as within the close setting of the home.
Finally, age is relevant to parental supervision. 144 Both the
spatial and social dimensions of parental control will fluctuate
according to the age of the child. The younger the child, the more
dependent he or she will be on the parent for support and guid-
ance. Not only will the child more often be in the presence of the
14
3 See W. DAMON, SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 264-65 (1983); Feiring
& Lewis, The Social Networks of Girls and Boysfrom Early Through Middle Childhood, in
CHILDREN'S SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL SUPPORTS 119 (D. Belle ed. 1989) (noting
that the most important part of an infant's social network is the family, specifically
the parents); Furman, The Development of Children's Social Networks, in CHILDREN'S
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL SUPPORTS, supra, at 151, 154-55 (commenting that in
the first three stages of a child's social needs, the parents play a primary role).
144 See Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 608, 615 (1979) (finding that conformity to parents
decreases with age); Utech & Hoving, Parents and Peers as Competing Influences in the
Decisions of Children ofDffering Ages, 78J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 267, 272 (1969) (same);
Young & Ferguson, Developmental Changes through Adolescence in the Spontaneous
Nomination of Reference Groups as a Function of Decision Conten 8 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 239, 250 (1979) (same).
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parents, but they will also have primary responsibility for structuring
the child's contacts outside of the family.145 As the child matures,
he will spend less time with the parents and will begin to take
charge of his own social relationships. 146 Parental control will be
correspondingly diminished.
147
These dimensions of parental supervision (spatial, social, and
chronological), provide a basis to analyze the parent's role in
juvenile behavior. By applying them to the child's relationships with
her surroundings, predictions can be made about those children's
activities which the parent realistically can be expected to control.
In addition to the child's -direct interaction with the parent, the
realm of possible child relationships can be classified into the
following four distinct tiers: (1) home and family, (2) institutional
affiliations, (3) social contacts, and (4) residual interactions.
The significance of the family, as evidenced in part by its unique
legal status, and the home, in both its physical and psychological
senses, merits separate attention. The authority of the parent is at
its height in the home, and it is there that both parent and child
frequently seek sustenance and mutual support. No other forum
can surpass the influence of the home environment on the child's
early development. 148  Outside of this milieu, the child typically
must rely on the parent for assistance in dealing with various
societal institutions, such as school, government, and religious
bodies. 149 The child's comparative lack of sophistication and the
formal nature of the interaction will make the parent's assistance
obligatory. Often the parent will have an interest in the institution
which is separate from the child's, heightening the duty to facilitate
the child's orientation to it.150  The typical youngster will also
develop a host of social relationships separate from any familial or
145 See Feiring & Lewis, supra note 143, at 119; Parke & Bhavnagir, Parents as
Managers of Children's PeerRelationships, in CHILDREN'S SOcIAL NETWoRKs AND SOCIAL
SUPPORTS, supra note 143, at 241, 241-42 (commenting that the most common way
families influence a child's social network is through the parent-child relationship).
14 6 See G. ADAMS & T. GuLLO'rro, ADOLESCENT LIFE EXPERIENCES 98-99 (1989);
J. HOPKINS, ADOLESCENCE 13,215 (1983); Bowerman & Kinch, Changes in Family and
Peer Orientation of Children Between the Fourth and Tenth Grade, 37 Soc. FORCES 206,
207 (1959); Furman, supra note 143, at 240.
147 SeeJ. HoPKINs, supra note 146, at 215-16; Berndt, supra note 144, at 608, 615;
Bowerman & Kinch, supra note 146, at 207; Utech & Hoving, supra note 144, at 272.
148 See Feiring & Lewis, supra note 143, at 119; Furman, supra note 143, at 154-55.
149 See Parke & Bhavnagir, supra note 145, at 244-45.
150 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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institutional affiliations. 151  Contacts with friends and other
informal associations comprise the third tier of interaction. Any
remaining children's activities are residual to these primary
classifications, and are remote from the parent's supervision.
This model of parental control can be diagrammed in the
following manner:
Infant Adolescent
Residual Interactions
Social Contacts
Resal Interactions
Family and Home
Faiyand Hm
Child
Each triangle represents a snapshot of the parent's influence at
a particular point in the child's development. The area of each level
corresponds to the degree of parental control; the greater the area,
the greater is the parent's access to the child and more significant
is his or her influence. As the diagram indicates, parental guidance
is not static; it changes over time and according to the relative
importance of other societal factors which diminish the parent's
influence. 5 2  Thus, the parent's role in structuring the young-
ster's activities is greater for an infant than for an adolescent.
1 53
The parent can readily examine the infant's physical state for signs
of abuse, as well as affect the opportunities for interaction with the
other parent, siblings, and friends. In contrast, the opportunities
for the parent to exercise guidance are significantly reduced by the
time the youth reaches adolescence. At this stage of development,
the youngster normally no longer allows the parent to monitor every
aspect of his or her physical condition, thereby reducing the
opportunity to detect signs of physical abuse. Moreover, the
adolescent has developed many important relationships outside of
151 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 146-47 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 144-47 and accompanying text.
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the home and family.15 4 Often, these interactions are completely
independent of the parent's influence.
The simplicity of this hierarchy does not diminish the import of
its message for parental responsibility laws. Holding parents
criminally liable for adolescent activities which occur at its outer
bounds is tantamount to imposing vicarious liability. This is also
true of parental supervision over the physical characteristics of the
adolescent, the inner most level in the second diagram. Since the
parent can exercise very little control at these points, the parent
would be punished based on the status of parenthood and not for
failing to meet a reasonable duty. As previously discussed, a parent
has no duty to do the impossible.
155
The vast difference in control between the infant and adolescent
requires that lawmakers tailor legislation to reflect the incremental
changes which occur in a child's life that lead to this disparity. A
parent reasonably should be accountable for the welfare and acts of
the infant, since the child is so utterly dependent. In contrast,
criminal liability should only attach for certain limited behaviors
involving the young adult. These include overseeing relationships
with other family members, activities which occur in the home, as
well as interactions with various societal institutions in which the
parent has an independent interest. 156 The assignment of crimi-
nal liability in each of these circumstances, however, does not
necessitate that the parent be held to the lowest level of culpability,
although this option can not be discounted as a matter of law. If
the legislature believes that. the state's interests are best served by
imposing strict liability, it has the prerogative to do so. Absent
strong empirical evidence showing that such a step would markedly
improve the law's deterrent effect and spare children unnecessary
suffering, it seems unfair to penalize the parent under a strict
liability standard. While the benefits of strict liability may be
realized in circumstances where the parent has the capacity to
exercise near absolute control over the child, its cost-the risk of
punishing parents who have made every possible effort to fulfill
their obligations-warrants extreme caution.
One situation where the parent is in a position to monitor the
child closely is when she is interacting with other family members
or residents of the home. Many states hold the parent criminally
154 See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 117 and accompanying text.
156 See supra text following note 115.
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liable for failing to protect the child from abuse when it is perpe-
trated by another member of the household. 157 The courts have
upheld the constitutionality of these laws in most every case.
158
The tragic consequences of abuse for the child makes the state's
interest in the activity extremely high. At least one state has
imposed strict liability on parents for allowing their children to be
endangered, including abuse by other family members. In State v.
Lucero,'5 9 a New Mexico court of appeals upheld the constitution-
ality of the state's child abuse statute, which defined abuse of a child
as "a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without
justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be: (1) placed in
a situation that may endanger the child's life or health; or (2)
tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished."160 The court
interpreted the statute to impose strict liability, and found that this
level of culpability was acceptable provided that "the public interest
in the matter is so compelling or that the potential for harm is so
great that the interests of the public must override the interests of
the individual. " 161  The New Mexico Supreme Court has since
upheld the same statute in a case which involved a mother's
conviction for child abuse for failing to prevent her boyfriend from
beating her child.1 62  The court ruled that mistake of fact and
duress were irrelevant, 163 perhaps implying that the defendant's
157 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
158 See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1984) (failing to seek
medical attention for son after husband fatally beat him), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1226
(1985); Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska App. 1988) (upholding conviction for
failure to prevent child abuse by wife); Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. App.
1980) (failing to prevent boyfriend from beating child to death); Bowers v. State, 38
Md. App. 21, 379 A.2d 748 (1977) (failing to stop beating by paramour), aff'd, 283
Md. 115, 389 A.2d 341 (1979); Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979)
(failing to stop child abuse by mother); Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467
(1960) (failing to stop fatal beating by paramour); State v. Lucero, 98 N.M. 204, 647
P.2d 406 (1982) (failing to prevent beating by paramour); State v. Walden, 306 N.C.
466, 293 S.E.2d 780 (1982) (failing to prevent assault on son by brother); Common-
wealth v. Howard, 265 Pa. Super. 535, 402 A.2d 674 (1979) (failing to prevent abuse
by boyfriend); State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986)
(upholding conviction of child abuse for leaving children with other parent who
physically and sexually abused them).
159 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975).
For a detailed discussion of this case, see Note, supra note 9, at 372-73.
60 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1 (1978).
161 Lucero, 87 N.M. at 244, 531 P.2d at 1217.
162 See State v. Lucero, 98 N.M. 204, 647 P.2d 406 (1982).
163 See id. at 206-07, 647 P.2d at 409.
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relationship to the child and the fact that the child had been abused
were the pivotal factors.
In addition to relationships with other family members, the
parent should have a duty to oversee activities within the home.
The parent's independent interest in the home's functioning, and
that the law is respected within its boundaries, provides a sufficient
basis to avoid the imposition of vicarious liability. Examples of
parental responsibility laws involving the home are public housing
codes which allow for eviction in the event that one or more family
members is convicted of a crime committed within the residence.
The District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community
Development instituted such a program in 1980.164 In that in-
stance, however, parents -were responsible for their children's
activities not just in the residential unit but within the entire
housing project. The age of the child also was not a factor in
establishing liability. Given the size of some public housing
developments, it is unreasonable to expect the parent to control the
child even in this limited environment. As one tenant lamented:
"[s]ome people try hard to raise their children right and it would be
bad to evict those people. Parent's don't know (all the time) what
their children are doing."
165
Unfortunately, some laws have extended the parent's duty of
supervision far beyond the home, holding out the prospect of
eviction based on any criminal activity on the child's part.
166
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Jack F. Kemp
recently precipitated a political firestorm when he outlined plans to
streamline eviction proceedings and utilize asset forfeiture laws to
seize leases of suspected dirug dealing public housing tenants.
167
The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act authorizes the forfeiture of leases of
individuals suspected of selling drugs, even without conviction.
168
Under pressure from constituents to curb crime in federal housing
164 Bowman, City WillEvict PublicHousingFamilies For Crimes Wash. Post, May31,
1980, at Al, col. 2.
165 Id. at A2, col. 2.
166 See e.g., Riley, Annapolis Considers Evictions in Mayor's Antidrug Effort; City
Would Remove Public Housing Tenants Convicted of Making or Selling Narcotics, Wash.
Post, Nov. 5, 1988, at BI (describing Annapolis Housing Authority program to evict
convicted drug abusers); UPI,July 14, 1982 (LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file) (describ-
ing Dade County Florida plan to evict families from public housing based on criminal
conviction of child).
167 See U.S. Seizing Leases of People Suspected In Illegal Drug Deals, N.Y. Times,June
26, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(5) (1988).
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projects, the U.S. Congress passed the eviction legislation, expand-
ing the boundaries of the parent's liability even beyond the housing
project itself.169 Again, when the child's behavior is so remote
from the parent's control, it is unjust to hold the parent liable.
Only when the criminal activity is committed within the home itself
should the parent be eligible for punishment. The Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), however, has since
developed implementing guidelines which limit lease seizures to
"any individual who has 'participated in, or knowingly allowed, at
least two felony drug offenses' in a public housing unit."170
Liability should also extend outside of the home and beyond
family relationships, but only under very limited circumstances.
Where both the adolescent and parent share a common interest in
a particular forum or institution, it is reasonable to expect the
parent to supervise at some level the child's interaction with it.
171
For example, both the parent and child have a common interest in
the proper functioning of the schools. 172 The parent reaps the
advantages of living in a technologically sophisticated society, which
is dependent on an educated workforce, while the child can use this
institution to further his or her personal development. For these
reasons, as well as the benefits that derive from the parent's
relationship with the child, the parent has an interest in the child's
attendance at school. This situation further provides a basis for the
state to impose liability on the parent when the child is absent
without cause.
In circumstances where the child's actions occur outside of the
home and the parent's presence, and not in a forum where both the
parent and child share a common interest, criminalizing the parent's
lack of supervision can not be justified. How a child behaves
outside of these settings, alone or among friends, is simply too
169 See id.
170 LaFraniere, U.S. Alters Plan to Evict Drug Dealers; Agents Move to Begin Seizing
Public Housing Leases of Suspects, Wash. Post, June 26, 1990, at AS, col. 1.
171 See supra text following note 115.
172 In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), the Court
struck down a New York statute which granted the franchise for school district
elections only to residents who owned or leased taxable real property in the district,
or were parents of(or had custody of) children enrolled in local schools. The Court
was sympathetic to the appellant's argument that "[a]ll members of the community
have an interest in the quality and structure of public education" and "the decisions
taken by local boards... may have grave consequences to the entire population." Id.
at 630. It held that the provision did not further a compelling state interest which
would justify denying the franchise to "seemingly interested" residents. Id. at 633.
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remote from the parent to warrant criminal sanctions. It is an
impossibility for the parent to monitor the child's every act. The
outer levels of the model are where the adolescent enters his or her
own domain, free from the parent's capacity to intrude or pro-
tect.173 There, the child's actions are truly his or her own.
CONCLUSION
Parental responsibility laws symbolize the frustration of a nation
which does not know how to cope with the problems of its youth.
Unable to contain juvenil-e violence and crime, legislators have
begun to fashion vaguely written laws which grant sweeping
authority to police and prosecutors to intervene in the affairs of the
family. While the state traditionally has been willing to impose
criminal liability for such extraordinary events as severe neglect or
abuse, it has never attempted to scrutinize the parent's skill at
providing ordinary supervision. One of the most private and
sensitive human relationships, that of parent and child, conse-
quently has been thrown open to inspection by the criminal justice
system.
The duty of parenthood no doubt includes a responsibility to
guide the child's personal development. The parent's ability to
supervise is by no means uniform throughout the child's life,
however, as maturity and competing social forces pull the youngster
farther from the parent's command. The most glaring shortcoming
of parental responsibility laws has been their unwarranted assump-
tion of parental omnipotence. Not only do they often fail to
recognize varying levels of parental authority as the age of the child
changes, they also assume the same degree of control no matter the
nature of the child's actions or in what forum they occur. This has
resulted in parents being punished not for their own acts or
omissions, but for those of their children.
The problem of unconcerned parents can not be disregarded
when evaluating social issues such as juvenile delinquency. The
173 In one highly publicized case, the Los Angeles District Attorney attempted to
prosecute a mother for allowing her son to associate with an infamous youth gang.
See Armstrong, supra note 23, at 8. The model presented here would forbid
prosecutions of this nature, since the child's actions occur at a level where the parent
has little or no control. The parent also would lack any independent interest in the
gang, thus heightening the chance that vicarious liability would be imposed. To the
extent that the parent failed to control the child's gang activities within the home,
however, the model would allow for prosecution since the parent could be expected
to exercise supervision in that setting.
1991] CRIMINALIZING POOR PARENTING SKILLS 1161
public's anger at parents who are ambivalent to their children's
criminal activity or abuse isjustified. The response of lawmakers to
constituent demands that parents who fail in their duty to care for
their children be punished is understandable. These facts, however,
are not sufficient justification to write legislation that bears little
relation to the parent's capacity to supervise, is overly vague, and
ignores principles of criminal causation. Parental responsibility laws
should be tailored to correspond with narrowly conceived duties
that reflect the parent's abilities. Lawmakers' recognition of a
model of parental control would be a first step toward realizing this
goal.

